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POLITICAL AFFILIATION ANDPERCEPTIONSOF TRADE: EXAMINING
SURVEY DATA FROM THE STATE OF GEORGIA
ROGER WHITE and RICHARD CLARK*
We examine the influences of political party affiliation and self-identification as
politically conservative, centrist, or liberal on individuals’ trade preferences. Majority
support for trade is reported for all political classifications, with Republicans found to
be 13.7%–15.1%more likely than Democrats and independents to support trade. Sim-
ilarly, conservatives are 14.8%–21% more likely to support trade than are centrists
and liberals; however, distinctions exist between ‘‘very conservative’’ and ‘‘somewhat
conservative’’ cohorts. (JEL F13)
I. INTRODUCTION
Frequently, the opinions of policymakers
and the public do not mirror the views ofmany
economists who believe that free trade is
a desirable goal. Noneconomists acknowledge
the associated benefits and indicate majority
support for trade (Fuller and Geide-Steven-
son, 2003), yet policymakers and the public
often express hesitancy; for example, recent
polls suggest that the public favors trade with
stipulations, particularly side-agreements con-
cerning labor and environmental standards
(Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2005;
Warf and Kull, 2001). Trade policy is formu-
lated based on policymakers’ views and opin-
ions, which are likely to be influenced by
constituent preferences. Alternatively, constit-
uents may align themselves with a political
party due to their views on other issues and
then take cues from party platforms when for-
mulating opinions concerning trade. In either
case, it is expected that party affiliation is cor-
related with an individual’s opinion regarding
trade.
Neoclassical theory predicts that while
trade liberalization results in detrimental out-
comes for some individuals, the removal of
trade barriers is, on net, welfare improving.
Accordingly, an individual’s support for trade
is expected to decrease as the perceived prob-
ability of experiencing a negative trade-related
outcome rises. Furthermore, one might antici-
pate that support for trade depends on an indi-
vidual’s level of risk aversion and the stake
they stand to lose if, in fact, a negative out-
come is realized. Thus, for the individual, con-
cerns over community and national welfare
may be tertiary, and when formulating opin-
ions on trade, individuals may consider the
likelihood that they will suffer a negative out-
come and, if so, the potential associated losses.
Several papers examine the determinants
of trade policy preferences (Hoffman, 2005;
Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; O’Rourke and
Sinnott, 2001; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001a,
2001b, 2006). Findings generally support the
predictions of neoclassical trade theory; how-
ever, these studies, with the notable exception
of Hoffman (2005), fail to consider the poten-
tial influence of party affiliation.Using Program
on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge
Networks data, Hoffman finds that party affil-
iation influences opinions on particular trade-
related events. However, this may reveal more
about opinions of the particular events and
involved parties than it does about general
perceptions of trade. For example, Hoffman
finds Democrats more likely than Republicans
to hold favorable opinions of North American
Free Trade Agreement, which was supported
by Bill Clinton but negotiated by the George
H. W. Bush administration, and Republicans
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more likely than Democrats to view the 2002
‘‘safeguard’’ steel tariffs, enacted by George
W. Bush, in a positive light. We seek to reduce
issue-specific influences by first examining
whether responses to seven trade-related ques-
tions independently correlate with party affil-
iation or political conservatism/liberalism. We
then consider whether a composite measure of
trade preferences (labeled as a trade percep-
tions index [TPI]), which is constructed using
the responses to the seven trade-related ques-
tions, correlates with party affiliation or polit-
ical conservatism/liberalism.
Our findings support and extend the litera-
ture. Party affiliation is found to be significantly
correlated with trade policy preferences, in
general, and for several of the specific trade-
related issues. Republicans are more likely
to favor trade compared to independents and
Democrats. These individuals are more likely
to agree that trade creates jobs domestically,
improves foreign relations, and strengthens
the global economy. They also are more likely
to disagree with characterizations of trade
leading to worker exploitation in developing
nations, environmental degradation, and in-
creased income inequality. Conservatives are
also more likely to support trade. Considering
the high correlation between political conser-
vatism and affiliation with the Republican
Party, this may appear unsurprising; however,
on particular trade-related issues, distinctions
are reported between ‘‘very conservative’’ and
‘‘somewhat conservative’’ cohorts. Compared
to respondents who identify themselves as
‘‘very liberal,’’ ‘‘somewhat liberal,’’ and ‘‘mid-
dle of the road’’ (hereafter referred to as ‘‘cen-
trists’’), individuals who consider themselves
somewhat conservative are more likely to agree
with the arguments that trade improves U.S.
relations abroad and that trade leads to envi-
ronmental damage. Very conservative respond-
ents are more likely to disagree that trade leads
to worker exploitation in developing nations or
that trade has led to a loss of U.S. jobs due
to corporations moving production abroad.
Trade preferences are also found to vary
with educational attainment. High school
graduates and individuals who have com-
pleted some college coursework are more
likely to oppose trade. High school dropouts
oppose trade on the issues of job creation
and income inequality. Higher income levels
signal support for trade. Asset ownership is
also a determinant, with homeowners sensitive
to potentially detrimental trade-related domes-
tic labor market outcomes. These individuals
are more likely to agree that trade has led to
U.S. job loss via outsourcing of domestic pro-
duction. Higher average weekly earnings in
the respondent’s county of residence are asso-
ciated with support for trade. This may be
taken as a community wealth or, possibly, an
asset effect. We proceed as follows. Section
II presents the estimation procedure, the data,
and associated variable construction. Section
III discusses the estimation results, while Sec-
tion IV concludes.
II. DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION
The survey data we employ were collected
as part of a University of Georgia Peach State
Poll administered between January 31 and
February 10, 2005. The poll included 800 tele-
phone interviews of randomly selected adults;
however, we employ a subset of the full sam-
ple—the 650 respondents for whom all rele-
vant data are available—when conducting
our empirical analysis. The survey was admin-
istered by landline telephone; however, this is
not expected to bias the sample.1 Tucker,
Brick, andMeekins (2007) show that the char-
acteristics of cell phone–only individuals and
those who have landlines are not dramatically
different, and polling data that exclude cell
phones do not differ significantly from polls
that include cell phones. Young adults are,
however, more likely to live in cell phone–only
households and, thus, are more difficult to
reach. As a result, older residents are fre-
quently overrepresented in survey data. The
discussion of age in survey response has a cor-
ollary with race—with white households being
easier to reach than African American house-
holds. While this may entail difficulties with
respect to the ability to generalize results, it
is important to note that we are less interested
in making population estimates about trade
attitudes than finding relationships among
variables affecting these attitudes. Since data
limitations preclude comparison of our data
to those of other states or to a national sample,
we acknowledge the potential shortcomings
of our data and proceed cautiously with this
in mind.
1. Interviews were conducted from 5 p.m. to 9 p.m. on
weekdays, from 11 a.m. to 7 p.m. on Saturdays, and from
2 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Sundays.
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Survey respondents were presented with
seven statements, prefaced by the question
‘‘Do you agree or disagree with this argument
(eitherinfavoroffreetradeoragainstfreetrade),
or have you really not thought much about it?’’
Specifically, the statements were the following:
1. Free trade creates demand for U.S.
products abroad, which stimulates economic
growth and creates jobs here at home.
2. Free trade is good for the United States
because it improves our relationships with
other countries.
3. Free trade creates a strong global econ-
omy, which benefits everyone.
4. Free trade allows companies to exploit
workers in developing countries with lowwages,
poor working conditions, and no job security.
5. Because of free trade, corporations have
laid off American workers and sent their jobs
overseas.
6. Free trade is bad for the environment
because a lot of countries have lower environ-
mental standards than the United States.
7. Free trade widens the gap between rich
and poor in the United States and in the world
as a whole.
Respondents also provided information
regarding household income, demographic
characteristics, political party affiliation, and
political conservatism/liberalism. The individ-
ual statements span a variety of trade-related
topics. Considering mean response values for
the full sample, general agreement is found on
several issues. Amajority of respondents agree
that trade improves U.S. foreign relations
(61%) and that everyone has benefited as trade
has created a strong global economy (51%).
Similarly, majorities agree that trade allows
companies to exploit workers in developing
countries (60%), has led to domestic job loss
as production has moved abroad (74%), and
harms the environment (56%). We also see
considerable variation in responses across
party affiliations and conservative/liberal clas-
sifications. Table 1 presents response frequen-
cies for the full sample and the various
classifications.
Examining the determinants of survey
responses for each of the seven trade-related
statements is important; however, the framing
of statements may generate biased responses.
Hiscox (2006) reports that framing questions
in an antitrade manner reduces the likelihood
that a given response indicates a favorable
opinion of trade. Of the seven trade-related
statements, the first three are positively
framed, while the final four are negatively
framed. To ameliorate the potential influence
of framing, we construct a TPI as follows.
Equation (1) illustrates.
The result is a ‘‘weighting-up’’ of responses
to positively framed statements such that, col-
lectively, these responses carry the same
weight in the index as do the negatively framed
statements. Subscripts denote respondent i
and statement j. The TPI measure is bounded
by zero and unity and provides an indication
of how frequently respondents answer in sup-
port of trade.
Agreement (disagreement) with any of the
first three statements or disagreement (agree-
ment) with any of the final four statements is
coded as 1 (0). Neither 0 nor 1 is recorded
for individuals indicating that they have ‘‘not
thought much about’’ an issue. For example,
if a respondent agrees with Statements 1, 3, 4,
5, and 7 and disagrees with Statements 2 and
6, then the TPI value is equal to 0.4583. Simi-
larly, if a respondent agrees with Statements
2, 3, and 7 but offers neither agreement nor dis-
agreement with any remaining issue, the TPI
value is equal to 0.7273. Thus, in the latter case,
it is assumed that the individual bases preferen-
ces toward trade on amore narrow set of issues.
The reliability of the TPI variable is estab-
lished by examining the intercorrelation
TPIcontinuousi 5
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among responses to the trade-related state-
ments. Cronbach’s alpha is a coefficient of reli-
ability, or consistency, which indicates, on a 0–1
scale, how well a set of items measure a latent
(underlying) variable.2 It is applied to multi-
variate scales to assess the degree to which
scale items (responses to statements relating to
trade, in this case) correlate with one another.
We have developed a set of items that, com-
bined, may indicate one’s views on a multi-
faceted construct: support for free trade.
Generally, an alpha coefficient above 0.7 is
assumed to indicate a sufficient level of reli-
ability; however, alpha values in excess of
0.9 usually indicate the existence of redundant
items. When constructing our index value,
employing responses to all seven statements
yields an alpha coefficient of 0.81. Exclusion
of individual statements results in alpha values
that range from 0.77 to 0.8. Thus, the overall
reliability of our constructed TPI variable is
high, and using responses to all seven trade-
related statements yields the most reliable
index measure.
The continuous TPI measure could be
regressed on a vector of explanatory variables;
however, due to problems associated with
bounded dependent variables, we instead con-
struct a binary TPI variable that is based on
the continuous TPI values and employ a logis-
tic function. We construct our dependent vari-
able as follows:
TPI
binary
i 5 1 if 1  TPIcontinuousi  0:5;
0 otherwise:
ð2Þ
The binary TPI measure categorizes indi-
viduals as supporting or opposing trade. For
any statement, responses are assumed to be
a function of individual characteristics, H,
including age, annual household income per
adult, race, ethnicity, gender, education, and
homeowner status. Average weekly earnings
in the respondent’s county of residence, C, is
also included to capture potential local area
asset effects (University of Georgia, Center
for Agribusiness and Economic Development,
2004). To examine the potential influence of
political affiliation, we include the vector U,
which contains dummy variables that identify
respondents as Republicans or Democrats.
Equation (3) illustrates. The vectorW includes
four dummy variables (very conservative,
somewhat conservative, somewhat liberal,
and very liberal) and can be substituted into
Equation (3) for U to permit evaluation of
conservative and liberal influences on trade
preferences.3
PrðTPIbinaryi 5 1Þ 5
eðaþbHHiþbUUiþbCCkþeikÞ
1þ eðaþbHHiþbUUiþbCCkþeikÞ:
ð3Þ
Included explanatory variables are consis-
tent with prior research that has found demo-
graphic attributes to be indicative of trade
preferences. Women and older individuals
are more likely to favor protection (O’Rourke
and Sinnott, 2001). Economic literacy affects
opinions on policy issues, making more edu-
cated individuals relatively more likely to
agree with the views of economists (Walstad,
1997). Blinder and Krueger (2004) conclude
that education increases the likelihood that
an individual will be well informed regarding
economic policy issues, and Hoffman (2005)
reports that college education is the factor
most likely to make individuals favor trade.
Individuals who earn higher incomes tend to
hold positive opinions of trade (Mayda and
Rodrik, 2005). Scheve and Slaughter (2001b)
posit that homeowners in labor-intensive
areas view protection as a means of protect-
ing/increasing property values.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the
full sample and each classification. Overall,
support for trade appears slightly guarded.
Both the continuous (47%) and the binary
(49%) TPI measures have mean values slightly
below one-half. Generally speaking, Republi-
cans and individuals who are somewhat or very
conservative provide responses indicating a sig-
nificantly more favorable view of trade. Repub-
licans are more likely to own their own home
and to be white, and average income per adult
tends to be higher in Republican households.4
2. The formula for calculating the alpha coefficient is
N  q
1þððN1Þ  qÞ, whereN is the number of items or dimensions
and q is the average intercorrelation among items.
3. When conducting our analysis, the null/excluded
groups are ‘‘independents’’ (when respondents are identi-
fied as Democrats or Republicans) and ‘‘centrists’’ (when
liberal/conservative self-classifications are included).
4. Although the homeownership variable may be
endogenously determined, excluding the variable from
the estimation equation does not significantly alter the
results. Ancillary estimation results, such as those where
the homeownership variable is excluded, are available
upon request from the authors.
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Democrat respondents are more likely to be
female and less likely to be white or college
graduates. The correlation between an individ-
ual identifying themselves asRepublican and as
conservative (somewhat or very) is 0.46. Simi-
larly, the correlation for Democratic affilia-
tion and liberal self-identification is 0.32. This
explains the commonality in mean response
values between party and conservative/liberal
classifications. It also indicates that, in the
empirical analysis to follow, examination of
conservatives and liberals provides a more
detailed portrait of party affiliation.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Examination of the determinants of trade
preferences is first carried out for each of
the seven statements employed to construct
the TPI measure. This presents an opportunity
to examine issue-specific influences on prefer-
ences. We then examine the determinants of
the binary TPI measure to determine the influ-
ence of each explanatory variable on overall
trade preferences. Section IIIA presents the
results for the former, while Section IIIB
presents those for the latter.
A. Policy Preferences for Specific Trade-
Related Issues
Table 3 presents coefficients generated via
estimation of the logit specification presented
in Equation (3). Across all issues, except the
outsourcing of domestic jobs overseas,
Republicans exhibit greater support for trade
compared to Democrats and (the control
group) independents. Results of estimating
our specification, modified such that party
affiliation is replaced by conservative/liberal
classifications, are presented in Table 4. Support
among conservatives mirrors that of Republi-
cans; however, variation exists between very
conservative and somewhat conservative co-
horts in terms of coefficient magnitudes and
level/incidence of significance.
Republicans are more likely to agree with
the arguments that trade leads to increased
foreign demand for U.S. goods and that job
creation results, improves U.S. foreign rela-
tions, and benefits everyone as it creates a
strong global economy. These same respond-
ents are more likely to disagree with the argu-
ments that trade leads to worker exploitation
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in developing countries, is bad for the environ-
ment, and increases income inequality both
domestically and abroad.
Somewhat conservative and very conserva-
tive individuals are more likely, compared to
liberals and (the control group) centrists, to
agree that trade creates domestic jobs via
increased foreign demand and strengthens
the global economy. These individuals dis-
agree with the statement that trade increases
income inequality both domestically and
abroad. Very conservative individuals are less
likely to agree that trade leads to exploitation
of foreign workers and domestic job loss due
to outsourcing of production abroad. Some-
what conservative individuals are more likely
to agree that trade improves U.S. foreign rela-
tions and are less likely to agree that trade
harms the environment.
The remaining explanatory variables offer
additional interesting information. High
school graduates and individuals who have
completed some college coursework are more
likely, in response to all statements, to oppose
trade. High school dropouts and college grad-
uates are less likely to agree that trade creates
domestic jobs and more likely to agree that
trade increases income inequality, both within
the United States and abroad. College gradu-
ates also are more likely to agree that trade
leads to worker exploitation abroad. Higher
average weekly earnings in the respondent’s
county of residence are positively associated
with trade support. Homeowners are less
likely to agree that an expanding export sector
creates U.S. jobs and are more likely to dis-
agree with the idea of trade leading to out-
sourcing of domestic jobs as production is
moved abroad and that trade damages the
environment. Finally, Hispanics seem to hold
favorable opinions of trade.
B. Overall Trade Policy Preferences
Estimation results generated from use of
the TPI are presented in Table 5. Columns
(a) and (c) present results from estimations
that regress the binary TPI measure described
in Section II on the set of explanatory varia-
bles. Columns (b) and (d) present results of
estimating the same specification with an
alternative TPI measure. This alternative
(restricted) TPI variable is constructed using
survey responses from only those individuals
who responded in agreement or disagreement
to all seven trade-related statements. The re-
striction is made to generate a set of respond-
ents who have clear opinions on all issues.
Such individuals may be better informed than
the remaining respondents with respect to
trade policy.
The significant opposition to certain trade-
related issues among high school dropouts
that was reported in Tables 3 and 4 has disap-
peared with adoption of the composite depen-
dent variable. These individuals have strong
antitrade opinions when confined to job-
related issues; however, clear opinions either
supporting or opposing trade are not evident
for other issues. High school graduates and
individuals who have completed some college
are less likely to support trade, regardless of
specification. Higher income, represented by
income per adult in the respondent’s house-
hold, is a significant factor in determining sup-
port for trade. African American respondents
appear generally less likely to support trade.
A similar finding, albeit at a reduced level of
significance, is reported for homeowners. Col-
umns (b) and (d) indicate that for the indivi-
duals who have offered an opinion on all
trade-related statements, the more mature
individuals are more likely to oppose trade.
Republicans and conservatives are more
likely to support trade, regardless of specifica-
tion. Applying the log-odds coefficients
reported in Table 5 and the corresponding
mean values for the full sample (presented
in Table 2) to Equation (3), we estimate that,
all else equal, Republicans are 13.7%–15.1%
more likely to support trade as compared to
Democrats or independents. Additionally,
contrary to the results presented for the indi-
vidual trade-related statements, no significant
difference in support for trade is found
between very conservative and somewhat con-
servative individuals. However, individuals
who identify themselves as very conservative
are 14.8%–21% more likely to favor trade as
compared to liberals and centrists. Similarly,
individuals who are somewhat conservative
are an estimated 16.7%–20.8% more likely
to favor trade.
Constructing estimates of the probability
that each respondent supports trade based
on the individual’s characteristics, those of
their county of residence, and the significant
coefficients presented in Table 5 permits com-
parison of estimated probability distributions
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across political party affiliations and conser-
vative/liberal classifications. Table 6 reports
the summary statistics, while Figures 1–4
present mean probabilities and associated dis-
tributions and illustrate the cleavage between
Republicans and Democrats or independents
and between conservatives and liberals or cen-
trists. Mean probability values derived for
each specification are reported in Table 5.
Broadly speaking, support for trade is found
across all political classifications; however,
Republicans and conservatives have, on aver-
age, higher estimated probabilities, as
expected, given the coefficient estimates pre-
sented in Table 3. Examination of the mini-
mum and maximum estimated probabilities
for each cohort reveals considerable overlap
of distributions. Furthermore, we see that
more than 90% of the estimated probabilities
are greater than 50% when the unrestricted
TPI measure is employed as the dependent
variable. Roughly two-thirds of the proba-
bilities exceed 50% when the restricted TPI
measure is employed.
C. Robustness Checks
Although the TPI variable is continuous
over the (0, 1) interval, we have employed
a binary variable in our empirical analysis.
This binary reclassification leads to a loss
of information that may have important
FIGURE 1
Estimated Probabilities, by Party Affiliation (Specification a)
FIGURE 2
Estimated Probabilities, by Party Affiliation (Specification b)
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implications for our results. Application of
ordinary least squares (OLS) when regressing
the continuous TPI variable on the set of
explanatory variables would result in inefficient
coefficient estimates due to the dependent vari-
able being bounded by 0 and 1. An alternative
estimation strategy would entail logistically
transforming the continuous TPI variable so
that the dependent variable becomes
lnð TPIcontinuous
1TPIcontinuousÞ.
5 Performing this transforma-
tion and reestimating the specifications detailed
in Table 5 produce results that are quite consis-
tent with the results obtained from the logit
estimations when the binary TPI variable is
used as the dependent variable. Results are pre-
sented in Columns (a) through (d) of Table 7.
Another alternative estimation method is
to employ the continuous TPI variable as
the dependent variable and to apply the tobit
technique with lower and upper limits set at
0 and 1, respectively, to account for the cen-
soring of the TPI variable. Results are pre-
sented in Columns (e) through (h) of
Table 7. As with the OLS estimations, we
see patterns of statistical significance and signs
of estimated coefficients that are largely un-
changed from those presented in Table 5.
Focusing on the coefficients on the party affil-
iation and liberal/conservative self-classification
FIGURE 3
Estimated Probabilities, by Conservative/Liberal Classification (Specification c)
FIGURE 4
Estimated Probabilities, by Conservative/Liberal Classification (Specification d)
5. Continuous TPI values equal to 0 were set equal to
0.0001 prior to the logistic transformation.
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variables, we find no change in the incidence of
significance or the coefficient signs. As before,
Republican survey respondents are more
likely to hold favorable views of trade relative
to Democrats and independents. Similarly,
respondents who report being either very con-
servative or somewhat conservative are signif-
icantly more likely to hold pro-trade views
compared to centrists and liberals. We take
these findings to imply the robustness of our
results to changes in econometric specification
and to indicate that our results are not depen-
dent on the binary reclassification of the con-
tinuous TPI variable.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have examined determinants of trade
preferences. Confirming prior research, we
find that the influence of education on prefer-
ences is nonlinear. High school graduates and
individuals who have completed some college
coursework are more likely to oppose trade;
however, high school dropouts appear to only
hold antitrade views on job-related issues.
Opposition is even more diffuse among college
graduates. Higher income is associated with
support for trade. Homeowners appear sensi-
tive to potentially detrimental trade-related
domestic labor market outcomes. Higher
average weekly earnings in the respondent’s
county of residence are associated with sup-
port for trade, possibly indicating a commu-
nity wealth or an asset effect. Consideration
of political party affiliation and conserva-
tive/liberal classification reveals that both
have significant influences on individuals’
trade preferences. Republicans are estimated
to be, on average, 13.7%–15.1% more likely
to favor trade compared to independents
and Democrats. Although, on particular
issues, distinctions are reported between
respondents who are very conservative and
those who are somewhat conservative, the typ-
ical conservative is 14.8%–21% more likely
than centrists and liberals to support trade.
While our findings support and extend the
associated literature, we acknowledge that our
survey sample is restricted to the state of Geor-
gia, which has a unique demographic, eco-
nomic, and political profile. This raises
concerns regarding the ability to make general
statements based on our findings. It is note-
worthy that rapid growth in Georgia’s popu-
lation over the past 15 yr or so has resulted in
Georgia now being home to many people who
were raised outside of the South. The state’s
population grew 26% between 1990 and
2000, and the majority of that growth can
be accounted for by people migrating to Geor-
gia from other U.S. states—13% from the
Northeast, 12% from the Midwest, and 10%
from theWest; 45% came from other southern
states and the remainder from other countries
(U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2007). While we
cannot determine whether this makes Geor-
gians any more or less favorable to free trade,
it may make them more like the rest of the
United States. This being said, party affiliation
and liberal/conservative classification may
correspond with loyalty, or opposition, to
the political party in power. For example, if
presidents are more likely to favor trade liber-
alization than is Congress, regardless of party
and ideology, survey respondents who identify
themselves as conservatives and/or Republi-
cans may likely report pro-trade views given
that the Bush administration is currently in
office but might have held less favorable views
toward trade during the Clinton administra-
tion. This underscores the importance for
future research that examines trade policy
preferences using sample drawn during differ-
ent time periods and from different geographic
areas.
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